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1. Executive Summary 
 
This paper summarises research from four years of the DFID-funded and LSE-led Conflict Research 
Programme, which provides comparative research on the drivers of conflict and ‘what works’ to 
reduce violence in five of the world’s most affected countries: Syria, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan and 
the DRC.  The findings are relevant for other conflicts, for example, Afghanistan, Yemen or the Sahel. 
The paper is written to inform the UK Integrated Review and the creation of the Foreign, 
Commonwealth and Development Office. It argues that the UK can only be more secure in a more 
secure world. Today’s conflicts are linked to other global issues including migration, extreme poverty, 
terrorism, organised crime and global pandemics. The UK cannot address these global issues and 
reduce global conflict unilaterally, and can only do so by working with partners, including through the 
multilateral system. This requires a decade-long, joined-up strategic approach focused on reducing 
conflict by applying the best diplomatic, development and defence resources available. Adopting such 
an approach would enable policymakers to continuously assess how UK and partner interventions 
interact with conflict at regional, national and local levels and to adapt them accordingly. This is clearly 
in the national interest, though we should expect UK interests in different parts of the world to come 
into tension with one another as conflicts and their protagonists evolve, for example if security related 
closures to borders or infrastructure disrupt trade and global economies or undermine local capacities 
to resist armed groups or respond to a pandemic. Better understanding these shifts could help HMG 
navigate trade-offs and act on opportunities as they emerge. 
The first part of the paper sets out three ‘logics’ of conflict and peace, indicating that interventions 
within a strategic approach are more likely to work when they take account of these. We argue that 
conflict should be understood as a set of competing ‘authorities’ driven by these ‘logics’, rather than 
as a war between ‘sides’ or a project to build a central state entity. The logics are 1) the ‘political 
marketplace’, driven by financial transactions for loyalties 2) ‘identity politics’, which mobilise people 
to support violent agendas (either in support of, or in competition with the financial incentives of the 
political marketplace) and 3) ‘civicness’, the opportunities presented by civic actors organising to 
reduce conflict and build long term constituencies for public goods. 
The second part of the paper notes interventions where our research has found evidence of a 
contribution to ‘civic’ outcomes. This does not mean that all these interventions should be supported 
everywhere, but that opportunities for ‘civicness’ should be supported where they emerge. The 
interventions identified include: 1) upholding international conventions and treaties; 2) peace talks that 
are multi-level and involve civic actors; 3) justice interventions that aid documentation and local 
problem solving during conflict; 4) humanitarian and development programmes that promote 
‘civicness’ and livelihoods; 5) targeted sanctions that do not fuel the political marketplace; 6) civic -
minded coalitions for security reform; 7) tax systems that move away from predatory extortion and 
contribute to public goods; 8) crisis response (e.g. to COVID-19) that is developed in partnership with 
local communities.  
We cannot know in advance what political formation will come out on top in these fragmented 
conflicts, but we can support actors that work towards UK interests; specifically where they contribute 
to civic good and to reducing conflict, and where they have potential, in time, to create stable nations 
that no longer pose a threat to the UK, are self-financing and enable local and global security and 
prosperity. 
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2. Main Recommendations  
 
 Understand conflict as a pervasive and persistent social condition and take a multi-level, multi-
dimensional and long-term (decade or more) approach. Apply diplomatic and programme 
responses that adapt to context, rather than the standard international template of policy 
responses and benchmarks (such as pre-, during or post-conflict). 
 Instead of seeing conflict in terms of ‘sides’, analyse it in terms of multiple public authorities 
operating according to different logics. This can help policymakers to better understand how 
conflict actually works in practice (including the trade-offs and risks inherent in different 
interventions), to identify opportunities to mitigate its violent consequences, and to set realistic, 
balanced and coherent objectives. 
 Conduct detailed analysis of patronage networks in conflict settings, and of the flows of finance 
that determine loyalties and authority, in order to understand the logic of the political marketplace.  
Pay attention to shifts in power (e.g. the death of a key leader) or economics (e.g. changes in 
revenue sources) to track changes in incentive structures, determine openings for shifting the logic, 
and avoid interventions that might fuel it.  
 Understand how identities are violently constructed (and reinforced by media and social media), 
through a logic of exclusivist identity politics, as a way to gain and maintain authority; how 
patronage groups draw on identity-based narratives and scripts to mobilise public support; but also 
how identity-based allegiances may motivate behaviour that runs counter to financial incentives. 
 Conflict analysis often seeks to identify spoilers, but should also pay attention to those who 
perform the opposite function, and represent a logic of civicness: citizens, professionals, activists 
and office holders, from local to international levels, who find creative ways to broker agreements, 
contest sectarian cleavages or extremist ideologies, resist corruption, and open up spaces for non-
violent deliberation. CRP research has identified three forms of civicness: 1) activism or protest; 2) 
the behaviour of individuals, such as uncorrupted judges or impartial doctors, or those who engage 
in self-help and mutual assistance at community levels; and 3) safe spaces and local authorities 
that are protected from the dominant logics. 
 Adopt a flexible approach to programming and avoid fragmented and contradictory responses. It 
is in the national interest for the UK to act as a civic agent in relation to conflict. This means actively 
avoiding policies that risk reinforcing the political marketplace or exclusivist identity politics, as well 
as supporting civic initiatives.  
 Currently, the move away from multilateralism threatens to reinforce the dominant logics of the 
political marketplace and identity politics worldwide, as powers are increasingly intervening 
independently in support of different actors. It is vital to develop tools and capabilities that could 
enable the UK, along with others, to reverse these tendencies. Multilateralism is not sufficient in 
and of itself to the promotion of civicness, but it is a necessary starting point for coherent 
policymaking. 
 Make conflict analysis and policy formation more agile, informed and reflexive. Prioritise research, 
analysis and communication to build a detailed and dynamic knowledge of context, and amplify 
the voices of those directly affected by conflict at every stage. This includes decolonising research 
through greater engagement with local researchers.  
 Peace talks should be: aligned with interventions on the ground; multi-level, including local as well 
as global and regional talks; and inclusive. In the UN-led Syrian political talks, for example, the Civil 
Society Support Room (CSSR) not only enriched UN mediation efforts by improving analysis of 
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conflict dynamics and signposting the way forward on key areas of agreement, but it also helped 
to facilitate humanitarian action on the ground and create the space for constituencies of change. 
 Justice should not be postponed until an overall settlement is reached, since the very nature of the 
political marketplace and identity politics involves a systematic disregard for the rule of law. In 
particular, there is a need to support legal activism, legal empowerment, community paralegalism, 
and efforts to document crimes committed during conflict. 
 Humanitarian assistance is necessary to save lives in conflict, but vulnerable to co-option. Longer-
term programmes that support livelihoods and civicness, and draw on detailed knowledge of 
context to avoid fuelling the political marketplace and identity politics, are likely to be more 
effective. When it comes to urgent humanitarian response, for example in instances of acute food 
insecurity, policymakers should be aware of the challenges of integrating famine early warning 
systems and conflict analysis, and triangulate these with timely research on how communities 
predict, prevent and mitigate their own food insecurity (especially where these manifest a logic of 
civicness), while supporting broader efforts to hold those responsible to account. 
 Security sector reform works best in the context of civic coalitions that are able to articulate 
effective political demands for reform. Promote such coalitions by fostering security dialogues and 
transparency initiatives, capacity building for civic-minded actors in and outside government, and 
including discussion of such issues in peace talks.  
 Targeted sanctions are an instrument that affects the internal functioning of a political 
marketplace, and may be instrumentalised by the elites of the target country in their own 
transactional politics. Political marketplace analysis is a useful tool for assessing their intended 
and unintended political consequences. 
 Promote the reform of tax systems, not just as an economic exercise, but rather as a method to 
forge pathways out of the predatory logic of the political marketplace. This should include a focus 
on bottom-up initiatives to increase civil society tax literacy within countries, and proposals for 
progressive taxation to reduce existing inequities and economic grievances, which have both 
national and transnational financial dimensions. The present global crisis offers an opportunity to 
develop alternative methods of financing public authority so as to contribute to a shift of logic. 
 The emergency response to COVID-19, both by governments and international agencies, has a 
better chance of success if designed and implemented in consultation with affected communities. 
The political marketplace tends to subvert top-down responses. The reduction in global financial 
flows, especially oil revenues, has the potential to weaken the political marketplace. At the same 
time, the severity of the expected recession is likely to hurt small business and the most vulnerable 
in society, diminishing the potential for civicness.   
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3. Introduction 
 
The Conflict Research Programme (CRP) is a four-year multi-disciplinary research programme funded 
by DFID. It investigates the drivers of conflict and ‘what works’ interventions in five sites – the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria. This note summarises our 
main findings, and their implications for HMG policy, as an input to the current process of reviewing 
the UK’s defence, security and foreign policy and the creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth, and 
Development Office. The CRP’s findings are framed by two broad conclusions. 
First, the CRP’s research suggests that contemporary conflict can largely be understood as a 
pervasive and persistent social condition in which multiple groups, associated with fragmented forms 
of authority, depend on violence itself both for finance and for political mobilisation. This contrasts 
with the idea of conflict as a deep-rooted political contest between two sides, for example government 
and rebel, where the aim is winning, and where there are clear beginnings and endings. These conflicts 
persist in countries in which the state has been disassembled and its components are subject to 
different authorities, often rivalrous, and where transactional politics conducted for short-term 
advantage trumps organised institutional politics. 
The implication of this is that the traditional toolbox for addressing conflict no longer works. Military 
intervention on one side or another carries a high risk of exacerbating violence. Top-down political 
diplomacy aimed at reaching a peace agreement usually formalises and entrenches the power 
structures inherent to the social condition. Humanitarian assistance, while it may be necessary, often 
fuels the political economy of conflict. What is needed instead is a multi-level, multi-dimensional and 
long-term approach, underpinned by detailed knowledge of context, and using a range of redesigned 
tools. The aim of such an approach is to chip away at the social condition of conflict by changing the 
logics that characterise the exercise of authority.  
Second, interventions designed to reduce the violent consequences of conflicts need to take account 
of their global and regional contexts, drivers and consequences. Contemporary conflicts are usually 
neither purely inter-state (international) nor purely intra-state (internal). In fragmented or disassembled 
states, the difference between internal and international is eroded. Conflicts are globalised and 
regionalised, involving transnational flows of arms, money, people (refugees, trafficked persons, 
international personnel, and volunteer fighters), smuggled commodities (for example oil,  drugs, or 
antiquities) as well as basic necessities, such as food.1 
Contemporary conflicts are inextricably linked to other global challenges, such as pandemics, climate 
change, extreme poverty, mass distress migration, high-level corruption, and the risk of nuclear war. 
For example, recent research on the impact of COVID-19 in some of our sites suggests that conflict 
areas are least able to cope with the illness, with significant consequences for the overall global impact 
of the pandemic, and for any future attempts at global containment of transmission.  
The UK cannot insulate itself from the risks that arise from contemporary conflict. It is in the UK 
national interest to contribute to ways of reducing or ending conflicts that are sensitive to their regional 
and global drivers, and are integrated in multilateral frameworks. The UK does not have the capacity 
to insulate itself unilaterally from global risks and threats, or to engage in geopolitical rivalries on equal 
terms, especially after Brexit. The UK can only be secure in a more secure world. Conflicts represent 
the sharp end of global insecurity. This is why a focus on ending conflict, and helping the victims of 
conflict, should remain a major priority.  
                                                   
1 This is evidenced, for example, in the CRP’s database of transnational conflicts in Africa. See Noel Twagiramungu, Allard 
Duursma, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot and Alex de Waal, ‘Re-describing Transnational Conflict in Africa,’ Journal of Modern African 
Studies 57, no. 3 (2019).  
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As a contribution to this, the CRP has developed a framework for conflict analysis. This framework 
explains contemporary conflict in terms of the interaction between overlapping and competing logics 
of public authority, notably those of the political marketplace, identity politics, and civicness. Levels of 
violence, and ultimately the persistence of the social condition of conflict itself, depend on the 
changing nature of this interaction. CRP research suggests that interventions can ‘work’ when they 
open up space for a shift of logic, by weakening the generally dominant logics of the political 
marketplace and identity politics, and nurturing existing or potential ‘pockets of civicness’. 
The following sections first summarise CRP findings on the character of contemporary conflict, 
drawing on examples from its research sites, before outlining the kinds of interventions, tools and 
capabilities needed to address and mitigate its drivers and consequences. 
 
4. Understanding Conflict 
 
During conflict a variety of sources of ‘public authority’ emerges. These sources are often in 
competition with each other. State structures may play a role but are unlikely to be the only source of 
public authority. All of our sites are characterised by fragmented or disassembled states, so a public 
authority could be a municipality, a customary or religious authority, a regional organisation or an 
international institution. We argue that the central issue is not national versus local, or state versus 
non-state, but how these different forms of authority function - what we call the ‘logic’ of public 
authority. CRP research highlights the importance of three logics of public authority in particular (the 
CRP list is non-exhaustive): the political marketplace, where competition for power is monetised; 
identity politics, where exclusivist ideologies based on ethnicity or religion shape and are shaped by 
the distribution of power; and civicness, where something akin to a social contract between authority 
and citizens exists, even at the height of the most intense fighting.  CRP research sites are dominated 
by the first two logics, which are the main drivers of violence. Nevertheless, what we might term 
‘pockets of civicness’ exist in all CRP sites.  
4.1 The Political Marketplace 
 
The political marketplace characterises all of our sites but has a different expression in each. There is 
no one model. We use the term ‘political marketplace’ to refer to a contemporary form of transactional 
politics where political power is commodified and subject to the rules of the market. In these countries, 
political loyalties and services are sold to the highest bidder in a competitive manner. For example, a 
ruler might bargain with members of the political elite over how much he needs to pay - in cash, or in 
access to other lucrative resources such as contracts - in return for their support. They exert pressure 
on him using their ability to mobilise votes, turn out crowds, or inflict damaging violence.  
All of the political systems studied by the CRP are extraordinarily complicated and different, but they 
do share some general characteristics.2 A successful formal state-building process is not taking place 
in any of these countries. Instead, transactional politics dominates over the functioning of formal 
institutions, and everyday transactional politics is exclusively an elite activity – there are significant 
barriers to participation for non-elites. Political power is fragmented, and different forms of violence 
(and the threat of violence) are widespread and diffused across all levels of society. 
Political markets, such as the ones we study, usually occupy a subordinate position in the world 
economic order, and are subject to movements in global markets and regulatory regimes outside their 
control (for example, in grain or commodity prices, trade rules and agreements or the regulation of 
                                                   
2 For a discussion, see Alex de Waal, Aditya Sarkar, Sarah Detzner, and Ben Spatz, A Theory of Change for Violent Political 
Markets, Conflict Research Programme Memo, February 2020.  
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illicit financial flows). As a result, they are uniquely vulnerable to external economic, political, and 
environmental shocks, and short-term politics in these countries is persistently unpredictable.  
External interventions form a critical part of these political systems, by providing resources for, and by 
changing the incentives of, actors in the marketplace. 
Finally, it is worth noting that not all fragile states are political markets, but all political markets are 
fragile states, or heading in that direction. 
The CRP approach enables analysts to assess changes in political markets over time. The CRP is 
developing a toolkit (which is a diagnostic method, rather than a standardised template) that can help 
us to understand how these systems actually function, even if — or especially when — they present 
institutionalised facades to the outside world. The toolkit can also help policymakers understand how 
these political systems are likely to respond to external interventions and other political and economic 
shocks. 
Among our cases, South Sudan is a classic example of a rentier marketplace, dependent on oil 
revenues, which collapsed when oil-production was shut down in 2012. Since then, political and 
military elites have relied on violence, pillage, funds and support from regional powers (notably Uganda 
and Sudan), as well as the prospective revenues from future peace deals, to fund their contest for 
power.3 In the last three years, the regime of President Salva Kiir has emerged militarily dominant and 
financially more capable than its rivals, but has not consolidated authority over the people or the 
territory in any meaningful sense. In this context, ‘peace’ means moderation of the coercive, autocratic 
regime in Juba.4  With the current collapse in international oil prices, prefiguring the transition to 
sustainable energy, South Sudan is also a poster child for the effects of unplanned or traumatic 
decarbonisation on fragile states. 
Somalia, on the other hand, remains a deregulated political marketplace characterised by a still 
nascent (and conflictual) federal structure, the lack of an effective, centralised national army, and 
multiple external patrons with divergent geopolitical interests. Numerous internal configurations of 
power exist, including a fractured ruling coalition of convenience (known as the FFK according to the 
names of its leaders): President Farmajo; Prime Minister Khaire, and the Director General of NISA, 
Fahad Yasin. The FFK, which retains precarious control over the political marketplace in the capital, 
has developed close security and aid relationships with external patrons (including Ethiopia, Turkey, 
Qatar and to some extent, the USA), consolidated its control over revenue collection and contracting, 
and used coercion to achieve its strategic goals. Nonetheless, the ruling coalition’s political agenda 
(beyond the pursuit/retention of political power and control) remains largely incoherent, reflecting the 
turbulence of the Somali political marketplace.5  
The Democratic Republic of the Congo can be understood as an amalgamation of interlocking, but 
relatively autonomous (or segmented) political markets.6 Political power (at the centre) is exercised 
through a series of constantly shifting networks and alliances, and Congo’s political economy is 
shaped by coercion, and characterised by conflict over control of key sites of revenue generation, 
including production sites, marketplaces, border posts, infrastructure, forced monopolies, coercive 
                                                   
3 Alan Boswell, Nanaho Yamanaka, Aditya Sarkar and Alex de Waal, The Security Arena in South Sudan: A Political Marketplace 
Study,  Conflict Research Programme Report, December 2019. 
4 Alex de Waal, Alan Boswell, David Deng, Rachel Ibreck, Matthew Benson and Jan Pospisil, South Sudan: The Politics of Delay, 
Conflict Research Programme Memo, December 2019.  
5 CRP Somalia Research Team, “Galmudug – Election Dynamics and Prospects,” Research Memo, Mimeo; CRP Somalia 
Research Team, “Jubaland – Election Dynamics and Prospects,” Research Memo, Mimeo; CRP Somalia Research Team, 
“Jubaland – Post Election Overview,” Research Memo, Mimeo; CRP Somalia Research Team, “South West State of Somalia – 
Post Election Analysis,” Research Memo, Mimeo; CRP Somalia Research Team, “Puntland – Retrospective Election Analysis,” 
Research Memo, Mimeo; CRP Somalia Research Team, “Somali Region, Ethiopia – pre-election dynamics and prospects,” 
Research Memo, Mimeo. 
6 Peer Schouten, Kasper Hoffmann, and Koen Vlassenroot, Congo’s Violent Political Marketplace, forthcoming.  
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resource extraction, price fixing and plunder and asset-stripping.7 Eastern DRC, in particular, remains 
highly militarised and fragmented, with politics increasingly militarised and militarised politics 
increasingly ‘democratised’. At last count, over 130 different armed groups exist in the Kivus alone, 
while the adjacent provinces of Tanganyika and Ituri are experiencing increasingly convoluted armed 
conflicts. It is worth noting that although a new round of political competition was triggered between 
the political networks of the former president Kabila and the current president Tshisekedi after 
elections in 2018, the rules of the Congolese political market remain unchanged.       
The CRP focuses on two political systems in the Middle East: Iraq and Syria. The political marketplace 
in Iraq is centred around unstable (and often violent) coalition-based competition for control over oil 
resources, associated contracts and government ministries and payrolls.8 Since 2003, most analysts 
have understood national power dynamics in Iraq through the lens of a national quota-based system 
(called muhassasah in Arabic) that distributes ministries and oil revenues across the country’s political 
groups according to ethno-sectarian allocations. At the sub-national level, however, political power is 
constituted and maintained both through coercion and transactional deals (often involving external 
and regional actors). In the post-ISIL period, Iranian-backing for certain   Popular Mobilisation Forces 
have transformed provincial political and security landscapes, to become the principal security actors 
in areas across several of the predominantly Sunni provinces, where they have traded on the role as 
guarantors of stability for taking cuts from local business and levying informal taxes, as well in some 
cases persuading the local populace to vote for their electoral candidate.9 Opportunistic alliances 
often cut across ethno-sectarian lines, defying assumptions around post-2003 identity-based politics. 
The primacy of purchasing loyalties over providing services has led to poor governance and pervasive 
instability, which is only likely to be exacerbated in the face of falling oil revenues.10   
Syria, the last of our cases, is a highly segmented conflict marketplace, which has been reconfigured 
rapidly since 2011 due to the inflow of external resources and force. The Syrian political market shifted 
from a centralised authoritarian state prior to the ascendance of Bashar al-Assad, to a violent war 
economy where the role of external actors became more important (in around 2012-13). 11 
International intervention functioned very differently in different segments of the market. Financial 
patronage from Gulf states and U.S. military assistance contributed to a highly deregulated and 
competitive market in opposition areas. More recently, Russian and Iranian interventions have 
assisted regime efforts to consolidate the market by force, with some success in the regime-
dominated market segment. Critically, however, the political system that has emerged from the 
conflict is not the centralised authoritarian system which existed prior to 2011, but a landscape 
consisting of several differentiated segments, combined with an oligopolistic structure in the regime-
controlled areas in which authoritarian gangsterism combines with kleptocracy.12  
  
                                                   
7 Tatiana Carayannis, Koen Vlassenroot, Kasper Hoffmann and Aaron Pangburn, Competing networks and political order in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo: a literature review on the logics of public authority and international intervention, Conflict 
Research Programme Synthesis Paper, 2017.  
8 Toby Dodge, Zeynep Kaya, Kyra Luchtenberg, Sarah Mathieu-Comtois, Bahra Saleh, Christine M. van den Toorn, Andrea 
Turpin-King and Jessica Watkins, Iraq Synthesis Paper: Understanding the Drivers of Conflict in Iraq, Conflict Research 
Programme Synthesis Paper, 2018.  
9 This will be expanded on in a forthcoming CRP article. Jessica Watkins & Mustafa Hasan, ‘Post-ISIL Reconciliation in Iraq and 
the Local Anatomy of National Grievances:  The Case of Yathrib’. 
10 See Mac Skelton and Zmkan Ali Saleem, Iraq’s Political Marketplace at the Subnational Level: The Struggle for Power in 
Three Provinces, Conflict Research Programme Report, 2020.  
11 See Anne Marie Baylouny and Creighton A. Mullins, “Cash is King: Financial Sponsorship and Changing Priorities in the 
Syrian Civil War,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 41, no.12 (2018): 990-1010. See also Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Rim 
Turkmani, ‘War Economy, Governance and Security in Syria’s Opposition Controlled Areas’, Stability: International Journal of 
Security and Development 7, no.1 (2018): 1-17.  
12 Yahya Fares, “The Political Marketplace in Syria,” 2019, Mimeo. 
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4.2 Identity Politics 
 
Exclusivist identity politics also occur in all CRP sites. The term refers to the claim to power on the 
basis of an exclusive identity, which could be ethnic or religious - for example, Dinka versus Nuer in 
South Sudan, or Sunni versus Shi’ia in Syria. The puzzle of the resurgence of politicised religion, 
nativism and various forms of exclusivist nationalism in the contemporary globalised world has 
preoccupied numerous scholars and other commentators. This puzzle is even more marked in the 
case of political marketplaces: there is no inherent reason why this ultra-neo-liberal system of 
governance should be associated with exclusivist identities. While most political markets are 
oligopolies with limited competition, their ‘ideal type’ is a more ‘perfect’ competitive political market in 
which identity-based affiliations are dissolved and replaced by individualised, opportunistic calculus. 
Indeed, one of the original rationales for formulating the political marketplace framework was to 
challenge identity-based framings of the wars in Sudan and Somalia: in both these countries, the 
observed political calculus of members of the elite were based on individual tactical bargaining in a 
competitive environment, routinely transgressing any principles of ethnic solidarity.  
What we find is that money is necessarily supplemented, by what we term ‘identity capital’, as a 
method of political mobilisation, or of recruitment into armed groups. Financial incentives alone 
cannot explain why men (and it is usually men) are ready to kill and to risk their lives. The notion of 
identity capital is adapted from Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of social and cultural capital acquired 
through education, taste, and family background; his theory explains the stability of complex and 
unequal social orders. Our contexts differ from European late modernity, which was Bourdieu’s focus. 
Our countries are disrupted and disordered; among their most salient characteristics are fierce 
contests over formal institutions and norms.  
Violence produces dramatic changes in power relations and the types of resources on which power 
asymmetries are based. All forms of capital - material, social and cultural - are dramatically 
transformed and reordered through violence and reinvented brutalist forms of identity capital are 
established. For example, social assumptions based on, say, taste or education, are upended and 
supplanted by a simplistic identification with ethnic or sectarian identity units. Just as in the UK, during 
the Brexit debate, being British or English came to mean more than being expert, something similar 
happens in our conflict zones.  
Political entrepreneurs make use of identity capital in order to reframe social discord, to dub political 
opponents as dangerous enemies or ‘terrorists’, or to provide a mechanism for organising a cohesive 
armed unit, inspiring selfless actions among followers or enticing support from foreign sponsors. 13 In 
eastern Congo, for instance, ethnic identity capital is one of the most salient resources of leaders of 
local armed groups, especially Mai-Mai groups,14 and customary chiefs.15  
                                                   
13 For an example, see Jessica Watkins, ‘Beyond Sectarianism? Transnational Identity Politics & Conflict in the Modern Middle 
East: Pasts, Presents, Futures’, Middle East Centre Blog, 2018.  
14 Mai-Mai groups are often mobilised within particular ethnic communities and to a large extent their public authority is built 
through their claims to defend these against foreign intruders, which can be framed in a number of ways (e.g. ethnic 
adversaries, state authorities, mining companies). In a context like eastern DRC marked by decades of multi-scalar violent 
conflict, institutionalised ethnic competition, militarisation, oppression, and patronage politics, ethnic capital has become a 
highly valuable political resource. It enables the leaders of armed groups to accumulate political and economic resources See 
Hoffmann, K., Verweijen, J., 2018. Rebel rule: A governmentality perspective. African Affairs  118 1–23. And Hoffmann and 
Verweijen: Rethinking Rebel Rule: How Mai-Mai groups in eastern Congo govern, Conflict Research Programme Blog, 03 
October 2018. 
15 Customary chiefs are considered to embody and guard the traditional values of ethnic communities in eastern Congo. 
Ethnic identity capital is the core resource of customary chief’s public authority, which is considerable. It has made them 
important political actors in rural areas in eastern Congo and enabled them to exercise control over resource and people there. 
For those reasons they are attractive allies and partners for external actors like rebel leaderships, army units, NGO’s, 
confessional organisations and business people. They can help mobilise recruits for armed groups, shape electoral outcomes, 
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Whether motivated by ambition, opportunism or desperation, a politician can draw on identity capital 
as well as money. But identity capital may follow a logic of its own; once people have experienced 
killing or the loss of loved ones in the name of identity, its singularity and exclusivity becomes 
entrenched, so that the politician remains forever marked by the identity label he opportunistically took 
on, and associated identity custodians and advocates are entangled in a political and social process 
for which they are poorly prepared. Violence represents a process through which fragmented forms 
of exclusive, singular and fixed identities are elevated as a way of establishing political legitimacy for 
disassembled public authorities, disrupting earlier forms of national identity associated with state 
formation.16 
Our research in Somalia, 17  Syria, 18  and Iraq, 19  investigates the process through which singular 
identities are constructed. In the case of Somalia, it was the war of 1987 to 1992 that turned out to be 
pivotal in the trajectory from a modernist state to a set of disassembled public authorities defined in 
terms of clan units. In Syria, sectarianisation was a deliberate process, fostered both by regime and 
Islamist militias, funded by different Gulf donors, through the selective use of violence, and combined 
with public messaging in the first few years of the war. In Iraq, it was the political settlement post-
2003 which confirmed Shi’a Islamist parties as dominant, and the emergence of a Sunni-Islamist 
insurgency which consolidated sectarian divisions. Iran’s political backing for Shi’a Islamist figures, 
military support for predominantly Shi’a Popular Mobilisation Forces to combat ISIL, and financial and 
technical support for Shi’a clerics, charities, and television channels has undoubtedly magnified the 
sectarian aspects of grievances between Iraqis.20 
Irrespective of how they began, wars tend to become framed as intra-ethnic, or intra-confessional, as 
they proceed. There are several likely reasons for this: political leaders’ preference for appointing their 
close kin to the most sensitive security positions (in government or armed opposition); the efficacy of 
ethnic manipulation by political leaders at times of anxiety; the tendency of people to seek out family 
or ethnic protectors at times of insecurity; the fact that territorially-based armed groups are more likely 
to survive the initial rapid survival-of-the-fittest competition in a condition of violent turmoil; the fact 
that rural insurgencies tend to be more resilient than urban ones, and rural territories tend to be 
ethnically homogenous; the preference for external sponsors to select armed groups organised on 
their preferred identity basis; and the cycle of atrocity and grievance that consolidates identity-based 
opposition.  
The result is that even when a conflict begins as (for example) a broad-based opposition to 
dictatorship, a protracted war tends to be redefined as a conflict among identity units. Beneath the 
overt conflict on ethnic or sectarian lines is a continuing contestation of the terms of the war between 
two categories: those that remain from the broad-based opposition, regrouped as civil society, who 
are pitted against exclusivist identity-based politics on all sides.  
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The dominant international approach to conflict resolution reinforces this tendency. Our research 
suggests that peace agreements (and, in common parlance, political settlements) tend to confirm, 
legitimise, and consolidate the process of political identity formation that occurred during the war. 
Such agreements do not necessarily end violence, but rather mark the moment when an international 
presence is deployed in the conflict zone. Indeed because of the consolidation of both identity politics 
and the political marketplace, the post-agreement situation is necessarily marked by continued 
turbulence and disorder, even if violence between the disassembled units, as opposed to violence 
against civilians, is lessened. Bell and Pospisil use the term ‘formalised political unsettlements’ to 
describe such agreements.21 
Finally, our research shows that even though they tend to co-occur, the relationship between identity 
politics and the political marketplace is by no means harmonious. Identity politics has its own logic 
that may contradict the requirements of transactional politics. There is no neat fit between 
disassembled political units, identity politics and the political marketplace. Indeed research in South 
Sudan uncovered the term ‘Nuer weu’ – the Nuer of Dinka money-  referring to a Nuer politician who 
struck a deal with a Dinka dominated government, following the logic of the political marketplace;-
something that was applauded by the international community as providing a basis for future 
agreement but which could not carry popular support.22 
4.3 Civicness 
 
Not all actions, spaces and institutions within conflicts are governed by the logics outlined above. A 
major finding of the CRP is that, in all of our field sites, and in the international dynamics and processes 
that relate to them, there are examples of a logic of civicness: civic-minded forms of resistance to 
corruption or exclusivism, mutual assistance within communities, and attempts to preserve or build 
forms of public authority more oriented towards the public good. Indeed, the existence of what might 
be called ‘pockets of civicness’ is a necessary condition for survival. In the midst of violence and 
criminality, it is only through the prevalence of civicness that minimal access to public services such 
as health and education or water and electricity is possible. 
Civicness should not be confused with civil society, although the terms share the same roots.23 Civil 
society in its contemporary meaning tends to refer to NGOs or to grassroots community groups. Such 
institutions and groups are perhaps likely to behave in civic ways, but they can easily be ethnicised or, 
in cases where they are dependent on external funding, be captured by political markets. Civicness 
may refer to activism but, more often, it relates to the behaviour of those who are engaged in public 
activities such as the provision of welfare, the courts of justice, the police and security services, the 
media, or even political assemblies that represent the concrete expression of the relationship between 
the polity and the individual.   
Our research has uncovered three forms of civicness. The first is direct activism and protests. 
Demonstrations in Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan have been explicitly organised around a narrative of 
opposition to corruption (one product of the political marketplace) and sectarianism (exclusive identity 
politics). In Iraq, the slogan ‘Bis mil-din baguna al-haramiya’ means ‘In the name of religion we were 
robbed by looters’.24 The logics of the political marketplace and of exclusivist identity politics tend to 
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be violently gendered, and it is notable that large numbers of women have been prominent within 
peaceful protests in all three countries.  
The second type of example has to do with the behaviour of individuals ranging from officials to those 
who work in public services to ordinary citizens. Thus, for example, in Iraq, we find doctors and nurses 
who refuse instructions from above to treat patients according to sectarian criteria.25 Or in South 
Sudan, we find legal activism, fascinating examples of how ‘committed judges, chiefs, lawyers and 
citizens try to reckon with everyday injustices even during a civil war.’ 26  In Syria, we find first 
responders to humanitarian emergencies like the White Helmets, or groups of people who try to keep 
public services going like the People of Aleppo who brought together engineers to repair water 
supplies, electricity or gas pipes.  
And a third type of civicness is to be found in safe spaces or even local authorities who have negotiated 
local-level ceasefires based on the involvement of citizens. While there are many examples in Syria of 
ceasefires that involve surrender to regime forces, there are also examples of negotiated safe spaces 
within the fighting. In eastern Ghouta, for example, under siege for most of the war, a dairy farmer, 
whose products were needed to feed Damascus made a deal with the government not to bomb his 
farm, which became a safe place for displaced persons and other victims of violence. Hama is another 
example where the dignitaries of the town kept out both government and opposition forces.  
It is important to note that parties to a conflict may also carry out acts of civicness or may co-opt 
civicness. In many places, politicians or armed groups may support ‘civic’ projects, but their capacity 
to do so is constrained by the logic of the system – they are ‘prisoners of the deal’.27 
The research on roadblocks in eastern Congo, for instance, shows that not all roadblocks erected by 
the notoriously corrupt Congolese army are viewed unfavourably. Roadblocks erected in high-risk 
areas are sometimes viewed favourably by travellers and residents as they provide some deterrent to 
robberies and kidnapping. In addition, they may provide shelter for travellers.28 While in Iraq, Hashd al-
Sha’abi or Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), parts of which are backed by Iran, have sought to 
associate themselves with the protest movement despite the fact that many of the protestors are very 
opposed to Iran.29 
Another example from the DRC is the opening up of the democratic space as part of elections.30 CRP 
research shows how citizens have claimed their right to vote as an expression of civicness. Armed 
groups have been directly engaged in campaigning, but the threat of using violence was not  
successful in guiding citizens’ voting behaviour. While a large part of the population developed 
strategies to accept the presence of candidates imposed by these armed groups, in most cases they 
did not vote for them. It shows the need to revise the sometimes simplistic, distinction between acts 
considered as civic and democratic and those considered non-civic and non-democratic (e.g. violence, 
identity politics, the trading of money for political support etc.). Our research indicates that such 
apparently opposite acts can, in reality, be complementary.  
An interesting finding from our sites is that the international encounter can enhance civicness. This 
does not necessarily mean through funding; other types of international action can also be effective 
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(and international funding needs to be agile and responsive to civic initiatives and opportunities). 
Examples include conditionality attached to support for hospitals in Kurdistan that meant that cancer 
patients from all over Iraq could gain treatment in those hospitals,31 diaspora activists who provide 
what is referred to as ‘social remittances’ in Somalia,32 or support for local journalists’ attempts to 
expose corruption in Iraq through the publication of the Panama Papers.33 
4.4 Regional and Global Dynamics 
 
The logic of the political marketplace operates in fundamentally the same manner at the local, national 
and transnational levels. This has the consequence that activities and privileges, conventionally 
considered a matter of sovereign public policy, can be traded for material reward to the highest bidder. 
The engagement of Gulf States in the Horn of Africa is an example of how the political marketplace 
operates at a regional or trans-regional level. For example, the rivalry between Middle Eastern states 
(especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one side, and Qatar and Turkey on the other) has played out 
in Somalia with these countries offering substantial financial incentives to members of the Somali 
elite and Somali state and sub-state authorities, in return for political alignment. The members of the 
Somali political class have expertly played these stronger rivals against one another, retaining more 
political autonomy than might be expected. In the case of Sudan, the ‘Arab Troika’ of Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE were able to dominate the Sudanese political market, excluding their regional rivals 
(Iran, Qatar and Turkey), and ensuring that their preferred security power-brokers in Sudan would not 
be disadvantaged by the democratic transition. The ability of these regional actors to move quickly, 
providing cash-in-hand to fund the political budgets of their chosen clients, has meant that they have 
shaped the transition far more effectively than either the Sudanese democratic forces, or western 
donors which have used the much slower and less flexible funding mechanisms of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions and ODA. As Ethiopia moves rapidly towards completing the dismantling of its previous 
developmental state and embracing the logic of the political marketplace, we can also see the power 
of regional brokers increasing. 
In the MENA, the political economy of oil has similarly permeated conflict dynamics across the region. 
Interventions over the past two decades by Iran and/or the Arab Gulf States into conflicts in Iraq, Syria, 
Yemen, Libya and Bahrain have been characterised by transactional deal-making with a series of 
warring factions at both the national and subnational levels. 34  These alliances have blurred the 
boundaries between state and non-state, and fuelled the functioning of political marketplaces at both 
centre and peripheries. In several cases, they have also exacerbated sect-driven domestic identity 
politics between Sunni and Shi’a through their choice of allies, and their media representations of the 
conflicts.35 This in turn has reduced the scope for external interventions promoting civic governance.  
In the case of Iraq, sectarian politics had already been set in motion by the post-Saddam political 
settlement supported by the Coalition Provisional Authority. The perceived political marginalisation of 
the Sunni population has undoubtedly generated sympathy domestically for Sunni insurgent groups 
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including al-Qa’ida and Iraq. Yet, Iran’s political backing for Shi’a Islamist figures and military support 
for a collection of predominantly Shi’a paramilitary factions has magnified the sectarian aspects of 
grievances between Iraqis.  
There do exist trans-regional and transnational civic links among think-tanks, NGOs and protestors 
(for example, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, or Kenya and Sudan) and, in some instances, regional dialogues 
have been promoted by multilateral institutions, such the African Union, IGAD (the Intergovernmental 
Authority for Development) in North East Africa, or the European Union. Regional institutions in the 
MENA region such as the Arab League or the Gulf Co-operation Council are much more state-
dominated. Nevertheless, some UN agencies, especially UNDP and UNICEF, have been able to 
promote initiatives like the regional Human Development or Human Security Reports that help to 
promote some transnational civic space.  
 
5. ‘What Works’ Interventions 
 
In most of our research, we find that external interventions tend to be subverted by the dominant logics 
of the political marketplace and identity politics, but these risks can be reduced if properly understood 
and considered within strategy, policy and programmes. Peace agreements consolidate political 
marketplaces defined in sectarian terms. Humanitarian assistance often ends up supporting the flows 
of funding required by the various identity based political entrepreneurs. Security sector reform turns 
out to provide another mechanism through which the different factions can compete for funding, 
status and integration in the state apparatus. Airstrikes contribute to sectarian polarisation and often 
empower the different armed factions on the ground.  
It follows from our analysis that external interventions are only l ikely to work, in the sense of 
addressing the underlying social condition that produces violence, to the extent that interventions can 
open up space for a shift of logic, whether they can a) weaken the dominant logics of the political 
marketplace and identity politics, b) identify moments of contradiction in the dominant logics where 
change might be possible, and c) nurture existing or potential ‘pockets of civicness’. Conflict analyses 
often seek to identify spoilers, but they should also pay attention to those who perform the opposite 
function: citizens, activists, professionals and office holders, at all levels from local to international, 
who find creative ways to broker agreements, contest sectarian cleavages or extremist ideologies, 
resist corruption, and open up spaces for non-violent deliberation. Those responsible for external 
interventions need to consider how such interventions affect the incentive structures of public 
authority and whether funding flows bolster, sideline or undermine the dominant logics.  
A holistic approach to intervention needs to start from the assumption that the UK itself can act as an 
agent of civicness. Underlying assumptions that remain prevalent among policymakers about ‘ancient 
hatreds’ or ‘ethnic rivalries’ need to be discarded, and any pressure to put short-term commercial 
interests before the needs of those experiencing conflict need to be resisted. Some HMG priorities 
such as upholding international conventions and treaties are generally both procedurally and 
substantively civic; while others, such as the commitment to multilateralism may be procedurally civic, 
but in practice can work for or against civic outcomes depending on the precise nature of the 
intervention undertaken. Meanwhile, defence and security partnerships, and funding flows that are 
insensitive to the conflict dynamics outlined above, run the risk of casting the UK as a spoiler to its 
own civicness-promoting interventions. Fragmented implementation along these lines is more likely 
to fuel conflict dynamics than to mitigate them. 
With these considerations in mind, and based on our research into what works interventions, we briefly 
outline some of the ways in which policy tools can be redesigned to work towards a shift of logic. This 
is not a comprehensive set of policy tools; rather it is drawn from the evidence collected by the CRP. 
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5.1 Research, Analysis and Communication 
 
A multi-level, multi-dimensional and long-term approach to conflict requires a substantial knowledge 
base acquired through detailed research, analysis and communications, especially with local experts 
and civic-minded activists at all levels. The research products CRP is developing aim to enable local 
activists and foreign observers to analyse the specific nature of the political marketplace in different 
contexts so as to identify moments and methods through which change might be promoted. For 
example, research on the political marketplace in Sudan has shown how the shift from oil as a source 
of revenue, to gold and mercenarism, involved a redistribution of power relations and opened up 
opportunities for civic change.36 Similarly, the CRP approach can be usefully applied as a basis for 
designing interventions aimed at weakening the political marketplace such as targeted sanctions (see 
section 5.6).  
Much CRP research is undertaken by researchers at local levels. The CRP team at Ghent University 
have published a series of blogs from local researchers aimed at ‘decolonising’ research on conflict.37 
This is the kind of initiative that needs support , not just to help those researchers, but also to improve 
the quality of contextual knowledge. The impact of research is probably greatest at local levels. The 
researchers themselves represent elements of civicness that influence the situations in which they 
find themselves, whether they are monitoring courts as in South Sudan and Somalia, mapping local 
authority in ways that have the potential for increasing accountability, or contributing to the 
transparency of revenue flows.  
5.2 Diplomacy 
 
Peace talks are important because they provide a political framework for a multilateral presence in 
conflict areas and, as such, are crucial for all external interventions. If we are to avoid the consolidation 
of political marketplaces, the conduct of such talks needs to be redesigned. Elements of such a 
redesign include: 
 Peace talks need to be thought of as an ongoing process (perhaps punctuated by agreements on 
specific issues), building relational contracts among the parties, rather than aiming at a decisive once-
and-for-all or one-size-fits-all settlement. 
 In terms of content, they need to align with external interventions on the ground and focus on issues 
such as ceasefires (albeit partial or temporary), lifting sieges, controlling border crossings, 
humanitarian access, and so on. Armed actors and their political allies are likely to press for 
consideration of constitutional questions and these may need to be considered in order to be able to 
discuss other issues, but they need to be discussed in terms of future processes and frameworks for 
involving the broader citizenry rather than in terms of specific outcomes. 
 Peace talks need to be multi-level – international, regional, national and local. At present, the focus is 
national. In particular, the international mediating team, usually the UN, needs to have a formal 
mandate (and funds) for acting in local talks and not just at the international level. Our research on 
local peace agreements shows that such agreements are pervasive in contemporary conflicts. Some 
agreements entrench the power of armed actors and may be merely about sharing the spoils of war, 
demographic engineering, or managing violence, and can even contribute to new forms of conflict. 
Others produce meaningful reductions in violence, improve livelihoods, and can create the space and 
basis for functioning institutions or even a for working towards a larger national-level settlement. Our 
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research suggests that they are more likely to ‘work’ in the latter sense, when civic actors are more 
involved in talks.38 International actors can play an important role in making this happen, as in the case 
of Galkaio in Somalia.39 Regional talks are also very important, especially in addressing flows of arms 
and finance. 
 Finally, peace talks need to be inclusive. CRP research demonstrates the value of including women 
and civic actors in peace-making initiatives both on and beyond political negotiations in contemporary 
conflicts. In the UN-led Syrian political talks, for example, the Civil Society Support Room (CSSR) not 
only enriched UN mediation efforts by improving analysis of conflict dynamics and signposting the 
way forward on key areas of agreement, but it also helped to facilitate humanitarian action on the 
ground and create the space for constituencies of change across divided communities to develop a 
shared vision for a future Syria. The close link of the CSSR to official processes was critical for 
legitimating and elevating the ‘political’ position and role of civil society in peace-making and 
peacebuilding in Syria. Even if the UN failed to reach a political agreement, the logic of civicness it 
injected into the process can be seen in the design of the Constitutional Committee, in the actions 
taken to broaden inclusivity and foster debate, in influencing the discourse of the political actors, and 
in articulating the political position of civicness within the Committee.40 
5.3 Justice 
 
The CRP analysis suggests that it is essential to be consistent in support for the principle and practice 
of advancing justice routinely at all levels, from local to global. The promotion of justice mechanisms 
is a necessary condition for a shift away from the political marketplace and extremist violence; the 
very nature of these logics implies a systematic disregard for the rule of law. Thus, the dysfunctions 
of justice systems underpin and exacerbate the social condition that constitutes contemporary 
conflict. Rather than waiting for conflicts to end, or for an overall peace settlement, in order to 
implement institutionalised transitional justice or rule of law programmes, our research suggests the 
scope for, and importance of, incremental, bottom-up efforts to improve the practice of justice at local 
levels even while conflict continues. 
Part of the problem is that multiple legal, normative and regulatory systems exist and are applied in 
all of CRP’s conflict settings. These include customary, religious and statutory law, as well as 
international humanitarian and human rights law, codes of conduct, and ad hoc regimes (e.g. arms 
embargo and financial sanctions). This plurality fuels uncertainty and creates opportunities which 
political actors exploit. In South Sudan, for example, statutory law and legal authorities and 
instruments have been harnessed to political agendas and implicated in human rights abuses, 
including through arbitrary arrests and detentions. Meanwhile local, customary, and religious courts 
have served political interests by regulating society, while reproducing norms that are functional to 
political entrepreneurs, who rely on ethnic differences as well as gender and generational inequalities. 
Furthermore, CRP carried out research in eastern Congo on projects by international and local NGOs 
to secure ordinary people’s land rights through formalisation and privatisation of pervasive customary 
land rights, which have become increasingly insecure. The research showed that these projects 
promote different types of land rights, and are often carried out in competition with each other, and 
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existing land authorities. They therefore risk increasing the uncertainty and fragmentation of land 
rights and become engulfed in existing power struggles over land.41 
Courts respond to all manner of crimes, from murder to domestic violence, and deal with difficult 
social issues from hunger to trauma.42 However, they have little purchase on war crimes or crimes by 
political elites. Yet local and customary courts are also adaptable, problem-solving institutions that 
have the potential for reform from below and to contribute to broader normative changes. They create 
openings for lawyers and paralegals to create new norms of legal practice, through documentation, 
advocacy and negotiation at local level. This activism is central to promoting accountability 
relationships between people and political authorities. 
Research in South Sudan has shown that legal activism has continued throughout its conflict, creating 
scrutiny, influencing social norms, and setting legal precedents, often with little or no financial 
support.43 These small gains at local level have the potential to be amplified through documentation, 
recognition, advocacy and support. International support for legal empowerment and community 
paralegalism is viable and impactful, even in conflict settings.  
In particular, documentation can serve as a vehicle for civic activism and participation in conflict zones 
and a catalyst for justice. Local human rights groups, women’s groups and victims’ groups organically 
emerge and coalesce around the investigation and documentation of human rights violations, 
because they recognise that such violations are key drivers and manifestations of the conflict, which 
should be addressed as a matter of priority. Documentation can catalyse justice efforts aimed at 
disrupting some of the networks and narratives that sustain the violence, e.g. accountability and truth-
seeking processes, or help meet pressing justice needs on the ground such as resolving housing, land 
and property (HLP) disputes, and providing restitution and compensation to refugees and IDPs. The 
availability and quality of documentation plays an important role in influencing both the likelihood and 
character of justice: whether justice is pursued or not, what form it takes, how effective and legitimate 
it is. 
Our research on Syria examined the documentation efforts of international actors and Syrian civil 
society and assessed their implications for justice. We found that their efforts have been closely 
aligned and focused on accountability, resulting in a growing number of universal jurisdiction 
prosecutions of Syrian offenders in Europe. However, they have largely neglected other aspects of 
transitional justice such as addressing HLP violations, which is the most urgent priority for millions of 
displaced Syrians. The implication is that policymakers should adopt a balanced approach to 
documentation, ensuring that the overall documentation efforts can catalyse and support both 
retributive and reparative/restorative justice processes and mechanisms.44 
5.4 Humanitarian Assistance 
 
Humanitarian aid is essential to save lives in conflict areas. In Syria, some 13.2 million people have 
been counted as being in need,45 amounting to 68% of the entire Syrian population. Around 70% suffer 
from lack of food security.46 In Somalia and South Sudan, humanitarian assistance has been essential 
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to preventing famine during the last four years and ‘no regrets’ programming has been adopted as a 
much-needed principle to inform timely response. 
However, even leaving aside problems of waste and logistics, humanitarian assistance tends to 
strengthen the political marketplace. Armed groups can become involved in the delivery of assistance, 
gain control over the distribution of food and health items and use the aid to favour loyalists and 
deprive the opposition of necessities. At local levels, the withholding of humanitarian assistance is 
often used as a tool to manipulate power relations. Even some civil society organisations seem to be 
drawn into the political marketplace. Our research in Syria has uncovered examples where 
humanitarian organisations favoured specific local NGOs for the implementation of health-related 
projects at higher costs and lower quality standards than those offered by other NGOs. Control of 
humanitarian aid by Government Ministers and pro-regime civil society organisations has provided a 
mechanism for shoring up support for the regime.  
Research undertaken by CRP Somalia has focused on understanding collusive relationships between 
aid, business and political actors and specifically with concern about how the allocation of security, 
humanitarian, and developmental assistance contracts contribute to violent political markets at the 
national and subnational level. A recent CRP study analyses how the distribution of food aid from the 
mid-1990s until 2010, as well as contributing to improved food security for some, empowered a group 
of kleptocratic business and political actors, involved in fuel supply, construction, and the provision of 
security equipment.47  The shift from food aid to cash programming in Somalia has shifted the 
epicentre of financial beneficiaries from contractors to formal financial institutions and money-
transfer operators, as well as to the local administrative level (including District Commissioners) that 
control and manage cash programming and other aid contracts either coercively or collusively with 
local and international NGOs. 
International interventions focused on humanitarian aid and state-building generate their own political-
economic dynamics. This is most clearly seen in Mogadishu, Claire Elder’s research,48 ongoing since 
2017, examines how the dominance of ‘powerbroker’ industries – economic activities in the logistics 
and infrastructure sector more broadly – has prevented the consolidation of state or political power 
and kept Somalia in a phase of ‘hyper-disorder’. Her work examines the interests, authority and 
financial practices of this group of powerbrokers, some of whom are linked to the international aid 
and security activities, and the ways in which they use insecurity, clan politics, credit-led exploitation, 
and donor discoordination to build authority and state-like governance structures, and keep the state 
at bay. She argues that the dominance of powerbrokers - rather than being an outcome of state 
collapse, endemic economic informality and structural underdevelopment - reflects deep 
contradictions within the fragile state discourse and tensions in the post-civil war political economy. 
Periods of collusion followed by violent confrontation occur as the Somali ‘state’ is both reliant on 
powerbrokers for security, political lobbying and conflict resolution but also as they seek to rein in their 
opportunism and consolidate power. 
Humanitarian assistance needs to be based on analysis of the political marketplace to establish 
whether the extent to which it risks fueling the political marketplace is outweighed by lives saved, and 
whether alternative methods can be found to reduce those risks. Longer-term programmes that 
support livelihoods and civicness, and which draw on detailed knowledge of context to minimise the 
risk of fuelling the political marketplace and identity politics, are likely to be more effective. From an 
economic perspective, livelihood projects have typically a more sustainable impact on household 
income and wellbeing (financial capital). In Syria, for example, support that was given to Syrian 
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agricultural projects and skills led to improvements in food security as well as increased  income at 
the household level.49 Such projects also helped to build skills, induce greater trust within communities 
as well as bringing together people from different areas through nurturing joint projects. Such projects 
also provide an incentive for individuals to give up fighting.  
Although such projects are less vulnerable to the predation of the political marketplace than 
humanitarian assistance, more research is needed on mechanisms for accountability and evaluation. 
In terms of shorter-term humanitarian response, CRP work has demonstrated some of the technical 
and political challenges of making famine early warning systems more conflict-sensitive. 50  The 
famines that are currently taking place all occur in conflict-affected areas characterised by monetised 
transactional politics.51 Indeed, the risk that the dynamics of contemporary conflict raise in terms of 
greater food insecurity are recognised in UNSC Resolution 2417. As such, in conflict-affected settings, 
policymakers should combine in their analysis of the information provided by famine early warning 
systems with detailed conflict analysis informed by conflict data, but also ongoing qualitative research 
on ways in which communities at risk predict, prevent and cope with food insecurity. In this sense, the 
approach again involves learning from examples where a logic of civicness emerges in the face of 
food insecurity that is likely to have been produced and exacerbated by the interplay of the dominant 
logics. This is also why it is so important for the UK, acting as a civic agent, to support efforts to ensure 
political accountability for famine or starvation crimes.  
5.5 Security Sector Reform 
 
CRP’s central finding regarding security sector reform (SSR) is that pro-reform coalitions, which could 
be described as civic pressure, are the only path to durable progress.52  
The UK can increase the efficacy of this pressure by calibrating its approach to fit the political 
conditions within the states it seeks to assist.  When the competition for political power within a state 
takes place between autocrats who purchase armed support – in short, a political marketplace - 
security reforms are not in the interest of anyone with the power to implement them. Further, 
experience has shown that pro-reform donors do not have the level of context-specific political skills 
necessary to prevent the resources provided to support SSR (and especially DDR) from being 
misappropriated. 
However, comparative research on patterns of SSR success show that at some point in each SSR 
success story, the existing ruling coalition (political elites, business interests, and security services) 
breaks apart. At this critical juncture, the states that achieved rapid and sustainable SSR gains, were 
those where domestic pro-reform advocates from different classes, regions, ethnicities, etc. were able 
to exert joint pressure around a broadly unified reform agenda and recruit supporters from the 
business community and/or security services and form a new civic coalition. Examples include 
Indonesia, Peru, and South Africa.   
Successful pro-reform coalitions do not emerge without effort. The UK can play the critical role of 
helping these coalitions be ready to succeed when reform becomes possible by:   
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• Sponsoring (and protecting) security dialogues and domestic transparency initiatives at the local, 
regional, and national levels (for and between multiple groups of stakeholders – women, youth, 
businesspeople, police, lawyers, judges, etc.); 
• Building the capacity of a variety of civil society actors throughout the state to weigh different reform 
alternatives and thus develop a context-appropriate security and justice agenda.  
• Pushing, during any negotiations, for inclusive (of interests beyond political parties and armed groups) 
discussion of, and agreements concerning, a broad range of security and justice issues.  
Military leaders and political elites cannot be allowed to make private, spoils-dividing back room deals. 
Peace agreements secured by pushing the SSR agenda (in particular, judicial reform and security 
governance / oversight measures) down the road are doomed to failure. 
5.6 Targeted Sanctions 
 
Political marketplace analysis provides a powerful tool to help explain how sanctions can penetrate 
into existing systems of transactional politics and influence the dynamics of power relations among 
members of the political elite. The political marketplace approach enables policymakers to understand 
1) the potential impact(s) of targeted sanctions, and 2) policy trade-offs that arise from their use. 
Effective targeted sanctions are predicated on detailed understanding of the target’s political system, 
the logic of how actors operate, their goals, constraints and incentives. Without adequate analysis, 
sanctions, as in the cases of Syria, Iraq or Serbia, often have unintended consequences that include 
violence and corruption, and which can serve to reinforce the very mechanisms of the political market 
while further undermining institutional politics.  
Sanctions impact political dynamics (for good or for ill) by selectively squeezing material access to the 
twin currencies of political power in political marketplace systems - arms and money. Through such 
material impacts, sanctions distribute political power; there are winners and losers (i.e., sanctions 
could increase the power of one warlord at the expense of another). This can fundamentally change 
how members of the elite in the political marketplace systems interact with one another, which can 
lead to elite fracture or cohesion, violent conflict or assist with consolidating peace. The crux is to 
understand the distributional impacts of sanctions (i.e., on elite access to money and weapons), how 
they will shape political market dynamics, and the how elite will change their behaviour as 
circumstances change and in accordance with the political marketplace logic. 
Assessing how sanctions impact on the political marketplace helps to: 
 identify the material sources of political power in political marketplace systems (i.e., violent 
capabilities and political finance), and which sanctions might impact. 
 identify winners and losers and understand the implications of (re)distributions of political power 
among them. 
 assess changing intra-elite relationships and bargaining dynamics (i.e., whether sanctions contribute 
to fragmentation of elite groups or greater coherence); 
 weigh the implications of removing sanctions (which can have equal political impacts to the 
imposition of sanctions). 
One good example of effective targeted sanctions is the gradually tighter sanctions imposed on 
Charles Taylor from 2001-2003 (arms embargo, diamond / timber ban, travel bans, aviation ban), in 
conjunction with other tools of statecraft, especially the indictment by the Special Court of Sierra 
Leone. The sanctions dramatically decreased Taylor's ability to fund his political budget, and lessened 
his coercive capabilities. This ultimately led to peace talks. The sanctions remained in place on Liberia 
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once Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf took power in 2006 (that is, an arms embargo and targeted measures - 
travel ban and asset freezes - on Taylor's associates / potential troublemakers). The arms embargo 
kept weapons out of the hands of Sirleaf's potential challengers, while the government forces were 
gradually able to acquire arms; the UN mission provided her extra muscle, giving her a massive edge 
in coercive capabilities vis-a-vis any potential elite challenger, which helped her consolidate political 
control, especially over the security arena. The arms embargo was so beneficial to her that she subtly, 
and successfully, manoeuvred to keep it in place until 2016, far longer than necessary (13 years after 
the war ended). She was also able to use her influence over lists of potential targets as leverage for 
political control. However, her increasing reliance on money, rather than violence, left Liberia still a 
prisoner of the political marketplace. 
5.7 Taxation 
 
Questions of how states are financed are at the heart of the CRP’s overarching political marketplace 
framework.53 As a longstanding body of literature argues, countries that are largely funded by external 
rents such as ‘mineral exports, aid and security cooperation’ are more likely to consist of patronage -
based or highly incorporated patron-client orders.54 Though taxation has often been seen as the 
relatively narrow purview of economists, a revitalised body of research, including work generated by 
the DFID and Gates Foundation-funded International Centre on Taxation and Development (ICTD), 
illustrates that taxes are deeply political.55 And, as the CRP’s overarching research agenda illustrates, 
taxes might be the key to helping states subvert or even break free of the political marketplace’s 
frequently coercive dynamics. Increasing the state’s dependence on broad-based tax revenue might 
enhance the delivery of public services because more people have a stake in how their taxes are 
spent.56  
In all of the CRP’s research countries, the vast majority of the decentralised parts of the state heavily 
depend on the central government for fiscal transfers. Likewise, parts of CRP countries that are 
particularly resource rich are often some of the most contentiously fought over, both in political 
discourse and at times in military campaigns to claim or occupy territory by the state and armed 
groups. With these dynamics in mind, interventions that more carefully consider tax reforms that 
subvert this relationship or potentially reshape the ways in which these regions relate to centre might 
be desirable. 
CRP research on taxes and political authority in South Sudan has identified and categorised a range 
of formal and informal taxes and payments in the country, and explored the ways in which they are 
tied to different types of public authorities and to ideas about the state and civicness. This research 
builds upon work that other CRP research teams have conducted in the DRC, which illustrates how 
taxes inform public authority in eastern Congo and also underscores the broad range of taxes in 
conflict-affected countries such as the DRC and South Sudan.57 In both South Sudan and the DRC, 
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these taxes and payments include those that people make to customary authorities such as chiefs, 
as well as the variety of taxes collected by officials working for different state revenue authorities. 
However, as our research illustrates, in the South Sudanese case, there is little evidence that any of 
these payments go beyond keeping the state machinery ‘alive’ at the local level. Crucially, this is 
despite the fact that nearly all respondents argued that taxes should be financing public services such 
as education, healthcare and other public goods.58 
The political marketplace in all of our sites depends on access to regional and global finance though 
these are declining. In particular, South Sudan appears to be traumatically decarbonising, as oil 
reserves are predicted to run dry by the end of this decade and there are suspicions that the 
kleptocratic regime is turning to other types of mineral wealth and other natural resources to finance 
the state.59 This transition in sources of revenue does offer a potential opportunity for a shift in logic. 
Given its uniquely outsized role in the country, HMG could support initiatives to improve taxpayer 
awareness of where their money goes, with a focus on local budgets, which are especially politicised 
following the on-going transition to 10 states in the country. More specifically, this could include 
programming to improve tax expertise in civil society organisations, to challenge the unspoken truism 
in South Sudan that a very small number of people, who essentially constitute the core of the ruling 
elite, truly understand the country’s balance sheets.60  Unsurprisingly, questions of who the state 
actually works for, and what people get in exchange for paying taxes, are arguably some of the most 
radical in all of the countries in which we work. 
At the same time, there is also a risk that newly appointed state Governors, who are widely believed to 
hold strong ties to the state, might be able to rapidly exploit the country’s tax system to expand the 
regime’s hold over the country. Given the reality that South Sudan is traumatically decarbonising, rising 
bottom-up pressures to undo the politics of the political marketplace are increasingly likely to be in 
direct competition with how political business has been conducted since at least 2011. While this 
example draws from the CRP’s South Sudan research, our findings are also applicable in other 
conflicts dominated by the political marketplace. These kinds of policy engagements have the power 
to help invigorate HMG’s engagement in other fragile, resource dependent, countries.  
5.8 Responding to COVID-19 
 
Our work on COVID-19 distinguishes between the epidemic itself (transmission of SARS-CoV2 leading 
to morbidity and mortality) and the COVID-19 crisis, which includes the secondary impacts on human 
wellbeing, other immediate social and economic impacts, political actions taken in the context of the 
epidemic and crisis which may have other motives and other outcomes, and the structural 
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implications of the pandemic and the crisis. Our analysis follows the established approach, ‘know your 
epidemic, know your response, act on its politics.’ 
All of our research sites are exposed to the transmission of COVID-19.61 While initial transmission 
occurred among well-connected, highly-mobile members of social elites, including (in some cases) 
international civil servants and aid officials, the general epidemics have taken hold among people who 
are poor and vulnerable, including populations in displaced and refugee camps, those in informal 
urban settlements, multi-generational families, and those in the informal sector, especially in and 
around markets and transport hubs. Prisons and detention centres are hubs of transmission. 
Population susceptibility to widespread severe COVID-19 related symptoms is associated with factors 
such as age demographics and co-morbidities, and the relatively young populations mean that case-
fatality rates are likely to be lower than in developed countries. However, there are vulnerabilities that 
expose our countries. In all our locations, essential supplies of personal protective equipment, testing 
kits, and respirators are grossly insufficient, contributing both to accentuated transmission and to 
greater risks of morbidity. Tertiary health care capacity is so limited as to be a near-irrelevance in many 
countries, and in Syria, a former middle-income country which was the best-equipped of our sites, we 
estimate that there are only 650 intensive care beds in the entire country.62   
During March 2020, there was an astonishing worldwide phenomenon of policy copycatting, whereby 
almost all countries adopted nearly-identical epidemic containment plans. These standardised 
responses were drawn from the influenza pandemic preparedness playbook, on the assumption that 
COVID-19 would follow the influenza pattern of a single two-to-four-month wave of infections. The 
policies consisted of variants of lockdown, social distancing, and isolation of the symptomatic, along 
with largely aspirational policies of widespread testing and contact tracing of those testing COVID-
positive. (There were outlier variants, including COVID denialists such as Brazil, Burundi and Tanzania.) 
Island states could become total exclusionists for a while. Highly authoritarian and administratively 
capable states such as China could implement sustained lockdown, case-identification and contact 
tracing for long enough to attempt total suppression. Each of our case countries implemented the 
time-limited transmission mitigation strategy. Unfortunately, the assumption that COVID-19 would 
behave like influenza was not correct. The lockdowns could be sustained only for a few months before 
they became unenforceable. In principle this was sufficient time to develop alternative strategies, but 
in almost all our sites, available funding and energies were absorbed by the dynamics of the political 
marketplace, so that they could not take the opportunity. Consequently, in most countries, including 
our cases, easing lockdown simply returns national epidemics to where they were when the 
lockdowns were first imposed. Assessments of the ‘success’ or otherwise of COVID-19 containment 
policies are therefore premature: it will only be possible to ascertain whether they have worked or not 
when national epidemics are ended, which is likely to be several years hence. 
Government responses to COVID-19, while initially similar, have evolved in divergent directions 
influenced by national political dynamics. In some countries, governments have drawn on a legacy of 
community health and civic engagement to adjust policies in line with local realities and popular 
demands. In others, governments have been influenced by the special interests of security or 
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commercial actors to target lockdown measures on certain communities or extend emergency 
financial assistance to certain businesses and not others. Generally speaking, small and medium sized 
enterprises have suffered, many of them going bankrupt, while larger corporations with deeper 
pockets and better political connections will withstand the downturn, and may emerge stronger 
insofar as they are able to expand their market share by moving into the vacuum left by those forced 
out of business. 
The COVID-19 pandemic is unprecedented in that its economic impacts unfold at both the local and 
international levels, threatening economic recession on a scale not seen for many decades. The local 
impacts follow from the adverse consequences of lockdown for the informal sector and social support 
networks that provide for the most vulnerable. The international impacts include a collapse in oil 
prices, removing at a stroke the single most important source of state revenue and political finance in 
oil producers such as Iraq and South Sudan. This accelerated traumatic decarbonisation risks major 
short-term destabilisation of political markets. Other impacts include massive unemployment in 
sectors geared to commodity exports and travel, and - of particular interest to our Somalia researchers 
- a dramatic downturn in remittances from family members working in vulnerable occupations in 
western countries.63  
In all of our sites, the pandemic compounds the fear and anxiety in which people live, often fuelled by 
rumours of conspiracy.64 The COVID-19 pandemic can also provide a context for resistance. As in the 
case of the DRC and in line with the Ebola pandemic, the protracted nature of conflict and violence 
helps to explain why populations have increasingly expressed, during periods of the Ebola and COVID-
19 pandemics, their resistance against humanitarian responses and against the central government.65 
In eastern DRC, for example, rather than accepting the health care priorities of interventions, people 
living in conflict-affected areas see pandemics as moments of struggle and resistance, and mobilise 
these moments to express their demands to a wide variety of public authorities. The same value-for-
life argument underlying current health interventions today is used by people to question how, in the 
name of bio-legitimacy, interventions select risks and thereby lives that are worth saving. 
The following recommendations arise from our initial research on COVID-19 in our sites. 
Our main recommendation is that emergency epidemic response has a far better chance of success 
if it is designed and implemented in consultation with the affected communities. There is some 
experience with the community model in the cases of Ebola and HIV/AIDS in Africa. In opposition 
areas, in north-west Syria, this approach seems to have been applied by medical NGOs and others. 
This recommendation applies not only to governments but to international agencies. The recent 
COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan launched by the UN Secretary General to help the least 
developed countries is a positive step but the UN, including the WHO, have not been able to exercise 
leadership - they have not set the narrative or led the agenda. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has accentuated the pre-existing trend towards remote management by 
humanitarian agencies, as expatriate staff are confined to headquarters. The overall trend in remote 
management has been to replace frontline aid workers with impersonal metrics for assessment and 
monitoring, rather than to delegate authority to local staff. This can result in aid agencies having a 
reduced understanding of the local realities. In the context of a rapidly unfolding epidemic, which has 
new and unpredictable effects, no existing metrics can be considered reliable, and understanding local 
context is therefore more important than ever.66  
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Our second main recommendation is that more attention needs urgently to be paid to the political-
economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis, which may turn out to be the most severe recession for a 
generation or longer, and contribute to major structural political-economic changes. In Africa, the last 
comparable economic crisis occurred in the 1980s, which so eviscerated institutionalised states that 
it gave birth to transactional, marketised survival politics among the elite. The turn towards mercenary, 
transactional politics was constrained by the combination of a new international aid order (the 
creation of DFID, the Jubilee Campaign, etc.) and the adoption of the norms, principles and institutions 
for peace-making and constitutional democracy by Africa’s leaders themselves. Comparable 
responses need to be put on the policy agenda today. The decline in global financial flows, especially 
oil revenues, opens up an opportunity for a shift of logic away from the political marketplace. In 
particular, both Iraq and South Sudan face traumatic decarbonisation.  On the other hand, the impact 
of the recession on small business may constrain civic possibilities. It is all the more urgent to develop 
thinking about how to address the underlying social condition and shift the logics of public authority.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this note, we have summarised the CRP’s conceptual framework, and suggested how it could be 
used to redesign tools and capabilities, in order to help reduce violent conflict in some of the most 
difficult places on earth. Our framework draws attention to the logics of public authority, which we 
have defined as the political marketplace, identity politics and civicness. 
Many of the interventions currently undertaken by international actors end up reinforcing the dominant 
logics of the political marketplace and 
identity politics. The CRP has investigated how interventions in such areas as peace talks, justice, 
humanitarian assistance, education, or sanctions could be redesigned to weaken or shift the dominant 
logics and nurture civicness.  
At the current moment, the opposite is happening. Populist regimes all over the world are exhibiting 
the dangerous combination of the political marketplace and identity politics that the CRP observes in 
our field sites. The spread of COVID-19 and the move away from multilateralism are likely to reinforce 
these tendencies. This could threaten the UK’s national interest both in obvious, short-term ways 
(distress migration, extremism, the inability to mount coordinated and effective infection containment 
policies globally), and in longer-term ways that we have yet fully to grasp. 
As seen in previous oil-related economic crashes, the parties and militias have used these non-oil 
alternative forms of political finance to maintain patronage networks and continue political co-
optation, effectively increasing their share of power in relation to a cash-strapped central government 
institutions. In light of such developments on the horizon, the newly installed government and 
international community have ever-contracting options at their disposal.
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